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RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY IN AN ACTION FOR CIVIL
PENALTIES AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF UNDER THE
CLEAN WATER ACT

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Americans have traditionally considered the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment as essential to the preservation of
justice. In Tull v. United States, the Supreme Court dealt with the question
of whether a federal court could deprive an individual of that right when
the Government seeks to impose civil penalties for violation of a statute.'
The question arose when the government sued William Tull, a real estate
developer, for violating the Clean Water Act2 and the Rivers and Harbors
Act.3
Congress passed the Clean Water Act "to restore and maintain the

chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters." 4 The
Act forbids the filling of wetlands and navigable waters without a permit

authorized by the Army Corps of Engineers? The government sued Edward Tull for violating the Clean Water Act by dumping fill on wetlands
on the island of Chincoteague, Virginia.' Tull dumped the fill to develop
and sell lots at three locations on Chincoteague Island: Ocean Breeze
Mobile Home Sites, Mire Pond Properties, and Eel Creek.7 He failed to
obtain a fill permit as required by the Act.' At trial, Tull did not deny
filling the properties and the waterway,9 instead, he argued that the properties were not "wetlands" as defined by the Clean Water Act.' In adI. Tull v. United States, 107 S.Ct. 1831 (1987).
2. Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
3. Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. §§401-426 (m)(1982).
4. 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1982).
5.Id.at§ 1311, § 1344, § 1362 (6)(7).
6.Tull, 107 S.Ct. at1834, n.I.Inaddition, the government amended its complaint and sued
Tull for placing fill
ina man-made waterway, Fowling Gut Extended, pursuant to the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899. Tull's Seventh Amendment claim was not based upon the violation of the
Rivers and Harbors Act because that
act allowed only for equitable remedies from which no jury
trial
accrues.
7.Id.at1833-34.
8.Id.
9.United States v.Tull, 615 F.Supp. 610 (E.D.Virginia 1983), aff'd.,
769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir.
1985), rev'd and remanded, 107 S.Ct. 1831 (1987).
10. Tull, 769 F.2d at184. Wetlands are "those areas that are inundated or saturated by surface
or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances
do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions. Wetlands
. .generally include swamps, marshes, bogs and similar areas." 33 C.FR. §323.2 (c) (1984).
He also argued that Fowling Gut was not a "navigable waterway" within the meaning of the Rivers
and Harbors Act.
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dition, Tull raised the defense that the Government was estopped from
seeking equitable relief because Army Corps of Engineers' employees
had misled him into believing that he did not need a permit and that his
activities were within the law."
The government sought injunctive relief and civil penalties against Tull
under the Clean Water Act.' 2 The Clean Water Act authorizes the issuance
of temporary or permanent injunctions for violations of Section 1319(b). 3
Section 1319(c) allows for the imposition of criminal penalties against
willful or negligent violators of the Act.' 4 Civil penalties of up to $10,000
a day may also be imposed on violators pursuant to Section 1319(d). "
The District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, levied a fine of $75,000
against Tull for filling the wetlands.' 6 The court also ordered Tull to restore
some of the lots which he still owned to wetlands and to stop further
filling activity on other lots.' 7
Tull made a timely demand for jury trial which the district court denied. ' The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the previous ruling
over a vehement dissent."9 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the case to the district court holding that the Seventh Amendment affords
the right to trial by jury to determine liability in cases in which the
Government seeks civil penalties.2 The Supreme Court also held that
Congress may authorize judges to assess civil penalties. 2' Justices Scalia
and Stevens dissented from this portion of the decision.22 This casenote
will focus upon the possible reasons for the Supreme Court's decision
and its ramifications.
BACKGROUND
The Historical Test and the Blending of Legal and Equitable
Claims
The Seventh Amendment of the Constitution states that "[in Suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars,
the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.... 23 Courts have interpreted
1I. Tull, 615 F. Supp. at 624.
12. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1319(b), (d) (1986).
13. Id.at(b).
14. Id.at(c).
15. Id.at(d).
16. Tul, 615 F.Supp. at626.
17. Id.at626-27.
18. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at1834.
19. Tull, 769 F.2d at 188-95.
20. Tull, 107 S.Ct. at1840.
21. Id.
22. Tull, 107 S. Ct. 1831, 1841. (Scalia, J.dissenting).
23. U.S. Const. amend. VII. The courts have interpreted the aim of the Seventh Amendment as
preserving the substantive right of jury trial as opposed to matters of form and procedure. This
means a jury trial with a presiding judge who rules on questions of law to aid the jury. The substance
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the term "common law" in the Amendment as meaning the common law
of England at the time of ratification of the amendments in 1791 .' At
that time, the English courts were divided into common law courts and
courts in equity. 5 Federal courts have traditionally applied a historical
test to determine whether the right to trial by jury accrues.26 If a cause
of action is analogous to one which was maintainable "at law" a party
is entitled to a jury; if analogous to one that traditionally arose "in equity"
the claimant does not obtain the right.27
In 18th Century England, suits in equity were heard by the King's
chancellors.2' The English courts of equity acted in those cases in which
the remedy at law was inadequate.2 9 A rivalry between the two systems
resulted in each borrowing aspects of the other so that by 1791 few clear
distinctions between law and equity existed. 0 This borrowing complicated
the task for courts when applying the historical test.
Courts have grappled with the problem of using the historical test to
determine whether the parties are entitled to jury trial when a case involves
a blend of legal and equitable claims as in Tull. In 1891, the Supreme
Court in Scott v. Neely 3 rejected any blending of the claim which would
deny the right to trial by jury even if two trials resulted. Notwithstanding
that decision, the courts continued to determine whether the action was
basically legal or equitable.32 If an action was predominantly legal, all
issues were sent to the jury and the judge decided the remaining equitable
claims.33 If an action was basically equitable, the court would decide the
equitable claims and "clean up" the incidental legal claims. 4
of trial by jury permits the judge to set aside the verdict, direct the verdict, allow demurrer, summary
judgment, and special or general verdict. 5 James William Moore, Jo Desha Lucas, & Jeremy C.
Wicker, Moore's Federal Practice P 38.08 [5] (2d ed. 1981) ("Moore's").
24. United States v. Wonson, 28 F. Cas. 745, 750 (No. 16,750) (1812).
25. Jack H. Friedenthal, Mary Kay Kane & Arthur R. Miller, Civil Procedure 483 (1985) ("Civil
Procedure").
26. Id.
27. Id. at 485. Some actions at common law are: trespass to property or person; trespass on the
case including suits for damages, trover, detinue, and replevin; ejectment; covenant; debt; assumpsit;
and account. Some actions in equity are: bill of peace; bill to quiet title; recission and cancellation;
reformation; specific performance; declaring or enforcing a trust; interpleader; injunctive actions to
enjoin the enforcement of a statute when unconstitutional; compelling compliance with a statute;
and enjoining repeated trespass to others or injury to property. Moore's P 38.11 [5-6] (2d ed. 198 1).
28. Id. at 483.
29. Id. at 487; Fleming, James Jr. Jury Trial, 72 Yale L.J. 655, 657-63; 3 William Blackstone,
Blackstone Commentaries 434 (ed. 1979). In the Act of Sept. 24, 1789, the First Congress of the
U.S. forbade the disposition of suits in courts of equity "where plain, adequate and complete remedy"
could be had at law. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 16, 1 Stat. 82 (1789).
30. Id. at 485. In terms of remedy, the distinction was still clear. For example, money damages
were handled at law and injunctive relief in equity.
31. 140 U.S. 106 (1891).
32. Rosanna Knitted Sportswear v. Lass 0' Scotland, Ltd., 13 F.R.D. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1952);
Brady v. TWA, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 504, 507 (D.C. Del. 1961).
33. Civil Procedure at 485 (cited in note 25).
34. Id. at 485, 486.
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The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandated the merger of
legal and equitable claims into one suit." After the adoption of the Federal
Rules, courts considered questions of equity first as well as those common
issues which were both legal and equitable before letting the jury handle
the case. 36 Often courts eliminated the role of the jury by deciding the
equitable claims first, thus disposing of the case. 7
In 1958, the Court in Beacon Theatres v. Westover,3" upheld the importance of the Seventh Amendment right when it held that trial by jury
could not be "lost through prior determination of equitable claims." 39
The Court reiterated the holding in Scott v. Neely that the right to jury
trial could not be forfeited when equitable and legal claims are blended.'
In addition, the Court stated that because the Constitution doesn't prohibit
jury trials in cases traditionally heard in equity, it does not bar Congress
from expanding the right to jury trial to actions not available in common
law." The Supreme Court clarified Beacon Theatres in Dairy Queen v.
Wood. 2 In Dairy Queen, the Court determined that the question of whether
the right to trial by jury accrued depended solely on the presence of any
legal issues.43
The Court in Ross v. Bernhard" expanded Beacon Theatres and Dairy
Queen by holding that when a claim involves a legal issue in a proceeding
historically arising in equity, the right to trial by jury cannot be lost.45
The Court felt that the nature of the issue was the determining factor
rather than the character of the action." In order to determine the nature
of the issue, the Court devised a three-part test. 7 Courts should first
attempt to find the nearest historical pre-merger analogue. Second, courts
should look to the remedy sought. Third, the court should consider the
practical abilities and limitations of juries.
Statutory Actions and the Seventh Amendment Right
Courts have also dealt with the question of applying the Seventh
Amendment to cases which originate from statutorily created rights and
35, Fed. R. Civ. P.1
36. Dairy Queen v.Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 471 (1962).
37. Id.at472.
38. 359 U.S. 500 (1958).
39. Id.at510-11.
40. Id.
41. Id.;
see generally Civil Procedure at481 (cited innote 25).
42. 369 U.S. at469, 473.
43. Id.at473. The Court in Dairy Queen held thatthe request for money judgment in the
complaint established a legal
claim even though the action was primarily equitable.
44. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
45. Id.at539. Ross v.Bernhard involved a stockholders derivative suit,
aproceeding traditionally
held inequity. However, the presence of legal
issues which ifa corporation had sued on its
own
would have been tried
ina court of law preserved the right
to trial
by jury.
46. Id.at538.
47. Id.atn. 10.
48. Id.
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causes of action which were not in existence in 1791. In NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Co.," the Supreme Court considered whether the right
to trial by jury was violated when Congress created an administrative
board to deal with complaints of fired employees." First, the Court applied
the historical test and found that recovery of money damages, a legal
remedy, was incidental to the equitable relief-reinstatement." Therefore,
the Court held that the suit was not essentially a suit at common law. 2
The Court analyzed the problem in this way despite the holding in Scott
v. Neely. In addition, the Court stated that because the administrative
proceeding was one unknown to the common law, trial by jury was not
mandated.53
After Jones, the question arose as to whether the decision meant the
Seventh Amendment right did not attach to new causes of action. The
Supreme Court took nearly 40 years to answer that question. In Curtis
v. Loether,5' the Supreme Court held that Jones merely stood for the
inapplicability of the Seventh Amendment to administrative proceedings
when jury trial was incompatible with the role of the regulatory body.55
The Court explicitly rejected the argument that the Seventh Amendment
is inapplicable to new causes of action created by statute.56 Curtis concerned the right to jury trial in a case for injunctive relief and punitive
damages pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1968." 7 The Court stated that
when rights created by statute are to be enforced by actions in the district
courts, a jury trial must be available if that action deals with the rights
and remedies enforced in a common law action.5" The Court applied the
historical test first to the type of action created by statute and found that
it was a tort damage action to enforce rights at common law.59 Second,
the Court declared the relief sought, actual damages, was of the variety
handled in courts of law.' Thus, the Court held that the Seventh Amendment applied to this case. 6' In reaching this conclusion, the Curtis Court
utilized the first two parts of the Ross test.
The principle espoused in Curtis, that statutory actions could entail
jury trial, was reiterated shortly afterward in Pernell v. Southall Realty.62
That case involved the recovery of a real property right under a District
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

301 U.S. 1(1936).
Id. at 48.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 48,
415 U.S. 189 (1974).
Id.at 194.
Id.at 193.
Id.at 189, 190.
Id. at 195.
Id.
Id. at 196.
Id. at 195.
416 U.S. 363 (1974).
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of Columbia statute.63 The action involved rights and remedies recognized
at common law and the statute required the dispute be brought in court.'
For these reasons, the Court held that the right to jury trial be preserved. 65
In Atlas Roofing v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,6 the issue was whether Congress violated the Seventh Amendment
by providing for an administrative agency to adjudicate violations of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act.67 The suit, like Tul, involved both
equitable and legal remedies. The statute provided for abatement orders,
which are equitable in nature, for the correction of unsafe working conditions." It also provided for collection of civil penalties, a form of an
action in debt which is a legal remedy.69 The Court, however, did not
apply the historical test to this case. Instead it focused on Congress'
ability to create new public rights and assign their adjudication to an
administrative agency.7' The Court stated:
[w]e cannot conclude that the Amendment rendered Congress powerless-when it concluded that remedies available in courts of law
were inadequate to cope with a problem within Congress' power to
regulate-to create new public rights and remedies by statute and
commit their enforcement, if it chose, to a tribunal other than a court
of law-such as an administrative agency ... "
The Court reasoned that because Congress created new public rights and
remedies, there was nothing which the Seventh Amendment required to
preserve. 72 The Court did not address the question of whether right to
jury trial could be withheld in a statutory action heard before a court as
in Tull.
The above cases illustrate how the Supreme Court has determined
whether a party is entitled to the right to trial by jury. In statutory causes
of action, cases can be adjudicated by administrative agencies as mandated
by Congress, without depriving the parties of their Seventh Amendment
right. On the other hand, the historical test must be applied to statutory
causes of action which courts adjudicate, to determine whether the cause
of action is more analogous to one at law or at equity.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 364.
Id. at 383.
Id.
430 U.S. 442 (1977).
Id. at 445. Unlike Tull, in which the defendant was entitled to a proceeding in court.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 450, 455.
Id. at 460.
Id. at 459.

Summer 19881

CLEAN WATER ACT

Civil Penalties and the Right to Trial by Jury
Courts have not consistently held that a right to jury trial exists in suits
involving the imposition of civil penalties." In cases specifically dealing
with civil penalties under the Clean Water Act, Courts have not granted
the parties a jury trial ." The confusion comes about when courts interpret
the nature of the case for the historical test.75 The Supreme Court has
never explicitly ruled on the right to jury trial in a civil penalties case.
The Court has only alluded to upholding that right in dicta of two early
cases, Hepner v. United States76 and United States v. Regan."
Hepner involved the Government's recovery of civil penalties for the
violation of an Alien Immigration Act. 7" The issue was whether the court
could grant a directed verdict in a civil penalties case in which no controversy of fact remained.79 Because only questions of law were left, the
Court affirmed the directed verdict of the lower court."0 In doing so, the
Supreme Court did point out that if questions of fact existed, the parties
would be entitled to a jury trial."'
In Regan, another civil penalties case, the Court similarly noted that
the defendant had a right to jury trial arising from the Seventh Amendment. 2 A question arose concerning the burden of proof under a later
Alien Immigration Act. 3 The Court held that the standard for civil cases
was preponderance of the evidence as opposed to the guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt standard necessary for criminal cases." Further ex73. United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830 (1977); United States v. J.B.
Williams Co., 498 F. 2d 414 (1974).
74. United States v. M.C.C. of Florida, Inc. 772 F2d 1501 (1Ith Cir. 1985), reh'g denied en
banc (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Ferro Corporation, 627 F. Supp. 508 (M.D. La. 1986);
Atlantic Richfield, 429 F. Supp. at 839, n. 13 and 843. In Atlantic Richfield, the court denied the
right to jury trial because it felt Atlas Roofing could not be distinguished. The case was not adjucated
before an administrative agency. The court did not see that Atlas Roofing did not rule out trial by
jury in a cause of action for civil penalties before a court.
75. The confusion arises when courts analyze the nature of the case to apply the historical test.
In both Ferro and M.C.C. of Florida, cases involving civil penalties, the courts held no jury trial
because the nature of the issue and the relief sought were equitable. Both courts relied upon
Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982), where the governor of Puerto Rico sought to
enjoin the Navy from discharging ordnance into the waters off the coast. The Court held that such
an injunction is an equitable remedy. No civil penalties were requested in Romero-Barcelo, thus the
Ferro and M.C.C. courts mistakenly relied upon that case.
76. 213 U.S. 103 (1909).
77. 232 U.S. 37 (1913).
78. Hepner, 213 U.S. 103.
79. Id.at 103.
80. Id.at 114.
81. Id.at 115.
82. Regan, 232 U.S. at 47.
83. Id. at 40.
84. Id.at 47-48.
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pounding on the difference between a suit for civil penalties and criminal
sanctions, the Court noted that the right to jury trial in this case arose
not from the Sixth Amendment but from the Seventh.85 The Court stated
this because the case involved a civil action of debt, a suit at common
law. 6

Because the Court's discussion of right to jury trial in those cases was
dicta, courts have not felt compelled to follow it. The Court in Atlas
noted the dicta because the case involved civil penalties but did not feel
it applied to suits decided by administrative agencies. To clarify its position on the constitutional right to trial by jury in court cases arising
from statutes inflicting
civil penalties, the Supreme Court granted cer7
tiorari to Tull.
ANALYSIS
The Majority's Decision
Justice Brennan writing for the Majority framed the issue in the Tull
opinion as whether the Seventh Amendment guaranteed the right to trial
by jury for both liability and assessment of penalties in an action by the
Government to collect civil penalties and injunctive relief.8" Although the
Clean Water Act does allow for suits involving violations to come before
district courts, it says nothing about allowing the right to trial by jury. 9
In addition, none of the Act's legislative history addresses this topic. For
this reason, the Court felt compelled to do a constitutional analysis based
on the historical test. 9°
The Court first considered the nature of the action to determine whether
or not it was analogous to an action at law."1 Agreeing with Tull, the
Court found that a suit for civil penalties was analogous to the 18th
century action in debt.92 Debt actions were handled by English law courts
so a jury trial would be required.93 However, the Court agreed with the
Government that the subject matter of this case was also clearly analogous
to suits to abate a public nuisance, actions argued in equity courts.' One
such suit was for a "purpresture" to enjoin or repair obstructions to public
waterways.95 Another was a suit to enjoin the activities of manufacturers
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 47.
Id.
Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1835.
Id. at 1833.
Id. at 1835, n. 3.
Id.

91. Id. at 1836-37.
92. ld. at 1836.

93. Id.
94. Id. at 1837.

95. Id.
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which polluted the environment." The Court concluded that finding the
closest 18th century analogue was not necessary because the Seventh
Amendment right could extend to causes of action not in existence in
1791.97
The Court looked instead to the remedy, civil penalties authorized by
Section 1319(d) of the Clean Water Act. 98 The focus of its analysis was
on the reason for inflicting the penalty. The Court contrasted remedies
designed to punish which emanated from law courts with those fostering
compensation or restoration for harm from equity courts." Because the
calculation of damages was placed at a maximum of $10,000 per day
and was not based solely on equitable determinations such as profits, the
Court felt that the remedy set out in Section 1319(d) was punitive in
nature, '
In addition, the Court noted the retributive nature of the penalties
reflected in the reference to the number of violations, lack of good faith
and economic benefits to the violator. 2 This reference was first found
in legislative history, but after oral arguments on this case the wording
was placed in the revised statute. 3 The Court also felt that deterrence
was a goal Congress had in mind when enacting the statute because it
based the penalty on its economic impact."' 4 The Court, therefore, concluded that because the relief set forth in Section 1319(d) was the kind
traditionally issued by courts of law, Tull was entitled to a jury trial for
the determination of liability.'0 5
The Court rejected the Government's argument that the Tull suit was
similar to an action for disgorgement of improper profits-an equitable
remedy. "s Disgorgement, the Court stated, is a type of restitution restoring
the "status quo." Section 1319(d) is not limited to this kind of remedy. t7
Likewise, the Court rejected the Government's contention that even if
the civil penalties were legal, jury trial would not be necessary because
the money damages were "incidental to or intertwined with" injunctive
relief.
The Court pointed out that the government sued primarily for the
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1982).
99. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1838-39.
100. Id. at 1839.
101. Id. at 1838.
102. Id.
103. Id., n. 8; Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-104, § 313 (d) 101 Stat. 46, (1987).
104. lull, 107 S. Ct. at 1838 n. 8.
105. Id. at 1839.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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purpose of obtaining civil penalties. "9 Because most of the property had
already been sold, Tull would not have been able to restore that land to
its previous condition."' More importantly, the Court cited Curtis v.
Loether to remind the Government that when legal and equitable claims
are joined, the right to trial by jury remains..' "The right cannot be
the legal claim as 'incidental' to the equitable
abridged by characterizing
'' 2
relief sought." 1
Finally, the Court dealt with the question of jury determination of the
civil penalties. Noting the legislative history which included a reference
to judicial assessment of the penalties, the Court considered whether
Congress could authorize judges to make that assessment." 3 The Court
believed that issue hinged upon the question of whether the substance of
the Seventh Amendment right would be violated when a jury was denied
that determination."4 The Court held that such assessment was not a
fundamental element of jury trial."' Because Congress had the power to
fix the civil penalties, the Court also reasoned Congress could delegate
that power to trial judges. "6 The Court held that judges could, therefore,
determine the remedy in a trial without violating the Seventh Amendment. 7'
The Dissent
Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens joined the Court in holding that jury
trial should be afforded in an action for civil penalties."' They disagreed
with the majority on the issue of the assessment of the penalty. "' Justice
Scalia writing for the dissent, noted that no case law exists to support
the notion of jury determination of liability but judicial determination of
remedy in a civil suit. 20 He did not address the majority's finding that
determination of the remedy is not an essential function of the jury. He
did find fault with the majority's reasoning regarding Congressional delegation of setting the amount of civil penalties. Scalia argued that the
jury trial guarantee is not related to whether or not Congress decides to
fix the amount of the penalty.' 2'
109. Id.
110. Id.

Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1839-40.
114. See note 23.
115. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1840.

116. Id.
117. Id.

118. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1840 (Scalia, J. dissenting).
119. Id. at 1840-41.
120. Id. at 1841.
121. Id.
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In addition, Scalia noted a comparison of judicial assessment of penalties with judicial sentencing in a criminal proceeding. 22
' He speculated
that if criminal trials are the model, then perhaps the burden of proof
should be raised from preponderance of the evidence to guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. 23
' Scalia did not go that far but stated that:
... the proper analogue to a civil-fine action is the common-law
action for debt, land that] the government need only prove liability
by preponderance of the evidence; but must, as in any action for
debt, accept the amount of award determined not by its own officials
but by twelve private citizens. 24
The majority did not respond to the dissent's opinion.
Why Did the Court Apply the Historical Test and Conclude that
this Case was More Closely Related to One at Common Law?
The Court felt obligated by the Seventh Amendment to apply the historical test because Congress had not stated its preference for jury trial
or court trial. 5 The Court's conclusion that this case was more closely
related to one at common law did not necessarily follow from a reading
of the statute. In fact, notwithstanding Regan and Hepner, courts traditionally have not allowed jury trials when enforcing the civil penalties
section of the Clean Water Act. 26
' The court of appeals characterized this
case in terms of the court's equitable power to determine the amount of
the fine.' 27 In addition, the court of appeals viewed the penalties as part
of a package of remedies issued to promulgate the equitable goals of
28
environmental preservation, fairness to third parties, and deterrence.
The Supreme Court chose not to pursue that route.
The Court recognized that this civil penalty suit could be just as anal29
ogous to an action in debt as to an action to abate a public nuisance.'
Following the lead of Curtis, the Court felt the characterization of the
remedy was determinative.' 30 The majority's analysis of the remedy concentrated on the punitive nature of the civil penalty."'3 The discussion is
not particularly convincing. One would think that basing the penalty upon
the economic advantage gained by the violator illustrates the equitable
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1835, n. 3.
See note 74, and accompanying text.
Tull, 769 F.2d at 187.
Id.
Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1836-37.
Id.at 1838.
Id.
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nature of the determination, restoring the "status quo," rather than the
punitive legal nature of a deterrent. In addition, the Court stated that
considerations such as seriousness of the violations, number of prior
violations, and lack of good faith illustrates the retributive component of
the penalty. 32
' These factors could also be thought of as equitable, offered
to appeal "to the 'King's conscience. """ Thus, the legal nature of the
statutory remedy may not be as clear cut as the Court portrays it.
The Court's approach is, however, consistent with the trend expanding
the right to jury trial which underlies the decisions in Beacon Theatres,
Ross, and Curtis. For example, in Curtis the Court upheld that right even
though Congress had expressed reservations about the role of the jury in
a civil rights suit. ' It is therefore possible that the Tull Court perceived
its affirmation of the right to jury trial for assessment of liability as a part
of that thrust of case law which expands the Seventh Amendment right.
The Court's decision also affirms that right in light of previous decisions
to allow the administrative adjudication of cases arising from statutory
causes of action. This decision might have been meant to assuage the
radical language of the Court in Atlas which dealt with the right to jury
trial in a suit for civil penalties. The Court stated that the Seventh Amendment "did not purport to require a jury trial where none was required
before."' 35 Indeed, the Court has "preserved" that right in cases based
on statutory causes of action not in existence in 1791. 36' The Tull Court
seemed rather to consider the distinction between jury and nonjury trials
set forth in Beacon Theatres. Jury trials
are constitutionally protected;
37
nonjury trials carry no such protection.'
In clinging to the right of jury trial for determining liability, the Court
may have been concerned with the importance of the jury's role as a fact
finder. 3 ' The Court alluded to this function regarding the triable issues
of fact concerning the nature of the fillings Tull used.' 39 In addition,
questions of Tull's good faith and his reasonable reliance upon the behavior of the Army Corps of Engineers' agents might have significantly
altered the outcome of this case had they been placed before a jury."
132. Id.
133. Civil Procedure at 484 (cited in note 25).
134. Curtis, 415 U.S. at 191-92.
135. Atlas, 430 U.S. at 459.
136. See Curtis, 415 U.S. 189 and Ross 396 U.S. 531.
137. Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 510.
138. The Court in Beacon Theatres quoted Dimick v. Schiedt 293 U.S. 474, 486 which described
the important fact-finding role of the jury. "Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding body is of
such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and jurisprudence that any seeming
curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized with utmost care." Beacon Theatres,
359 U.S. at 501.
139. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1834.
140. Judge Warriner dissenting in the Court of Appeals' decision brought up questions of fact
and liability in Tull. Warriner stated that the Corps refused to issue a cease and desist order according
to regulations. Tull 769 F.2d at 191. The district court states that a formal notice to cease and desist
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Therefore, even though equitable aspects of this case exist and civil
penalty cases have not been traditionally tried before a jury, the Court
chose to stress the importance of the Seventh Amendment right by applying the historical test and concluding that a jury was mandatory for
determining liability.
Why did the Court Choose to Bifurcate its Analysis of the Seventh
Amendment Right into Jury Determination of Liability and
Damages?
The most puzzling aspect of the Tull decision is why the Court took
the penalty assessment away from the jury. This part of the decision is
particularly paradoxical because the Court based its conclusion that a jury
was necessary to determine liability on its analysis of the remedy. The
Court, while reversing the court of appeals' decision, actually agreed with
the lower court that the role of the judge was to use his statutorily derived
equitable power to assess the penalty.' 4
One possible reason for this bifurcation is that the Act's legislative
history shows that Congress may have intended that judges perform the
assessment of damages. 142 The statute was in fact, amended after argument
to the Supreme Court to include factors "the court shall consider" to
determine the fine (emphasis added). 143 This wording seems to suggest
judicial rather than jury assessment. If the majority felt that the wording
applied to the judicial determination of penalties, it might have tailored
its decision in order to defer to Congress, mindful of subsequent suits
pursuant to this section.
Another reason the Court withheld determination of damages from the
jury might be related to the third prong of the test the Court developed
in Ross.'" What role did the practical abilities and limitations of a jury
trial play in this decision? The Tull Court stated that it did not use those
considerations as an independent basis for extending the Seventh Amendment right.'4 5 However, those considerations might have had an impact
upon why the Court chose to limit the Seventh Amendment right. In
Atlas, the Court upheld the validity of Congress' power to provide for
the adjudication of statutory causes of action in administrative proceedings. " By doing so, the Court valued the efficiency of the administrative
filling in Eel Creek and surrounding wetlands was sent on Mar. 3, 1976. Tull, 615 F Supp. at 615.
Warriner also pointed to Tull's efforts to comply with the Corps' instruction and the Corps' fiveyear surveillance with aerial photographs of Tull's project. Warriner ironically noted "Tull, not the
Corps, was fined $75,000." Tull, 769 F.2d at 189.
141. Tull, 769 F.2d at 187.
142. 123 Cong. Rec. 39,190-91 (1977).
143. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, §313 (d) 101 Stat. 46 (1987).
144. Ross, 396 U.S. 538, n.10.
145. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1835, n. 4.
146. Atlas, 430 U.S. at 461.
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agencies in competently handling specialized questions. 4 7 The Atlas Court
also felt that such proceedings would relieve pressures of overcrowding
in the courts.' 48 Although not stated, Ross' third prong appeared to influence that decision because the Court considered that juries do not
possess the specialized knowledge of the agencies. In addition jury trials
for new causes of action such as these would "choke the already crowded
federal courts with new types of litigation."' 49
In Tull, the Court stated that trial judges traditionally have performed
highly discretionary calculations taking into account multiple factors when
determining penalties."'° This statement may likewise indicate that the
Court felt that these complicated determinations were better left to judges
because juries may have limited ability to handle them. Therefore, the
Court may have considered the intentions of Congress as well as the
practical abilities and limitations of juries when it chose to withhold the
assessment of penalties from the jury to promote efficiency in the disposition of these cases.
Was the Court Correct When it Did Not Allow the Jury to Assess
the Amount of the Penalty?
This question can be viewed in a variety of ways. Jury assessment of
the penalty does not make sense in relation to the rationale the Court
used for the determination of liability. The Court found a right to jury
trial on liability because it characterized the remedy as punitive, but
proceeded to remove the determination of that remedy from the jury.
Because the Court's finding of punitive remedy necessitated a legal rather
than equitable proceeding, it does not follow that the Court strip the jury
of determination of remedy in a civil case. Furthermore, as Justice Scalia
contended, if the Court followed the criminal model with judicial sentencing, it should extend the model in the interest of justice to include
the higher burden of proof, guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 5'
Secondly, the Court offered no basis for concluding that jury determination of remedy was not a fundamental element of the right to trial
by jury in a civil case. The Court cited two cases which addressed the
nature of the right to jury trial.' 2 In Galloway v. United States, the Court
held that a directed verdict did not offend the Seventh Amendment. 153 In
Colgrove v. Battin the Court held that a 12 person jury was not required." 4
147. Id. at 455.
148. Id.
149. td.
150. Tull, 107 S. Ct. at 1840.
151. Id. at 1841.
152. Id. at 1840; Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973); Galloway v. United States, 319
U.S. 372, 392 (1943).
153. Galloway, 319 U.S. at 392.
154. Colgrove, 413 U.S. at 157.
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The Court considered these practices "procedural forms and details" of
jury trial, not the substance of the common law right.' 55 The Tull Court
implied that jury determination of remedy was a similar procedural incident or detail of jury trial. Jury determination of remedy cannot be so
easily dismissed since it had traditionally been an integral part of the way
in which the jury administered justice.
From a practical standpoint, allowing judicial determination of penalties may result in more efficient use of the court's time. A judge may
be more qualified, consistent and experienced in making necessary calculations. Lay persons may have difficulty considering congressional factors such as economic benefits and seriousness of violations resulting in
more time spent for such determinations. Finally, despite the possible
practicality of this decision, the Court, while appearing to expand the
role of the jury in civil penalty actions, has actually undermined it.
Ramifications of the Tull Decision
The decision in Tull has significant ramifications for the federal courts.
Some 225 sections of federal statutes provide for the imposition of civil
penalties.' 5 6 By allowing the right to jury trial in these cases, the federal
courts may become even more backlogged. Congress may choose to
respond to such a situation by allowing for more administrative adjudications involving civil penalties to bypass the historical analysis necessary
to the Seventh Amendment.
The Court's decision in Tull may also affect the Government's response
to violations. Assuming the Government would seek to avoid jury trials
because of the added time and expense, it may choose to sue only for
the equitable remedy of injunctive relief when it has that option. This
action might cause the Government to sue sooner, which in the environmental area would serve to stop the polluting activity before the damage
were done. The Tull case illustrates this. If Tull's activity were stopped
when the Corps first became aware of the illegal filling, the wetlands
could have been preserved. Instead, the Corps waited for five years taking
aerial photos and collecting evidence to make a case against Tull for civil
penalties.
Finally, the holding which allows for judicial assessment of remedy
may conceivably extend to suits other than for civil penalties. The Court
explained its reasoning using the broad term "remedy" instead of "civil
penalty." The Court may be setting the stage for allowing judicial determination of damages in other contexts.
155. Galloway 319 U.S. at 392.
156. See Appendix, Amicus Brief for petitioner (Tull) by Virginia Trial Lawyers Assoc.

622

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 28

CONCLUSION
The Court's purpose for granting certiorari in the Tull case was to clear
up the confusion which existed among the circuits regarding the right to
jury trial when the Government sues for civil penalties. The Court clarified
that issue, and in doing so appeared to reaffirm the fight to jury trial. By
dismissing the practice of jury assessment of penalty, however, the Court
diminishes the importance of the jury and jeopardizes the Seventh Amendment right.
BARBARA L. LAH

